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ABSTRACT—COVID-19 has shone a light on the preexisting flaws in the
criminal justice system. This Essay focuses on one of the challenges the
criminal justice system faces in light of COVID-19: that of a pretrial
detention system that falls more harshly on poor and minority defendants,
swells local jail populations, is fraught with bias, produces unnecessarily
high rates of detention, and carries a myriad of downstream consequences,
both for the accused and the community at large. Long before the first
confirmed case, United States’ jails were particularly susceptible to
contagions. The COVID-19 crisis exacerbates this problem creating an acute
threat to the health of those in custody and those who staff our jails. The
pandemic reveals that even during “ordinary times” the pretrial detention
system fundamentally miscalculates public safety interests to the detriment
of both detainees and the communities they leave behind. Simply put, current
pretrial detention models fail to account for the risks defendants face while
incarcerated and pit defendants’ interests against the very communities that
depend on them.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of COVID-19 cannot be overstated. As of July 23, 2020,
the new strain of coronavirus, which causes COVID-19, has infected over
ten million people, leading to 633,369 deaths worldwide.1 The death toll in
the United States alone exceeds 125,000.2 On March 11, 2020, the World
Health Organization officially classified COVID-19 as a pandemic.3 In
response, governments across the world declared states of emergency and
urged citizens to distance themselves from one another, a practice now called
social distancing.4 Schools, bars, restaurants, and entertainment venues
closed.5 Nonessential workers were ordered to stay at home.6 Group
gatherings were prohibited7 and the frightened public was told that staying

1
COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/RE74-JHDX] (updated regularly).
2
Daily Updates of Totals by Week and State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ANQ-NQ4Q]
(updated
regularly).
3
WHO Director-General, Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefingon-covid-19---11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/M57R-HE3H].
4
White House Adviser Warned of Risks of Pandemic; Trump Misleads on Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html
[https://perma.cc/2XCG-86XF] (chronicling the worldwide response to the disease).
5
See C.D.C. Gives New Guidelines, New York to Close Restaurants and Schools and Italian Deaths
Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/coronavirus-live.html
[https://perma.cc/QD33-PHT7].
6
See Coronavirus: What You Need to Know, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N,
https://www.nga.org/coronavirus/#states [https://perma.cc/D7LC-8TQY] (tracking each state’s orders
regarding nonessential workers).
7
See, e.g., Interim Guidance: Get Your Mass Gatherings or Large Community Events Ready for
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Mass-Gatherings-Document_FINAL.pdf
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home in isolation is the only way to defeat the virus and “flatten the curve”
of the infection.8 Even as nations and states begin to “reopen,” fear persists
that such actions may be premature as infections rates continue to climb9—
and these rates are unreliably low, as access to testing remains elusive.10
In the United States, daily briefings from the White House COVID19 Task Force stoked the unease. The public was told a vaccine remains
elusive and distant;11 there is insufficient personal protective equipment for
healthcare providers12 and insufficient ventilators and hospital beds for the
infected.13 Medical experts note that while COVID-19 can prove fatal across
[https://perma.cc/F5BV-HAWC] (recommending canceling or postponing gatherings of ten or more
people).
8
Siobhan Roberts, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/science/coronavirus-curve-mitigation-infection.html
[https://perma.cc/X26P-JY4J].
9
See Ramsey Archibald & Anna Claire Vollers, Alabama Coronavirus Cases Surge to New High as
State Reopens, AL.COM (May 29, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/2020/05/alabama-coronavirus-casessurge-to-new-high-as-state-reopens.html [https://perma.cc/5TB9-ZNHY]. But see Eric Levenson, Nick
Valencia & Jason Morris, A Month After Reopening, Georgia Coronavirus Cases Continue Slow and
Steady, CNN (May 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/26/us/georgia-coronavirus/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8WL6-TABP] (suggesting that reopening has not caused a spike, though infection rates
continue to rise steadily).
10
See Sarah Kliff & Julie Bosman, Official Counts Understate the U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/us/coronavirus-deathsundercount.html [https://perma.cc/R3ZY-6KHD]. According to the CDC and international epidemic
experts—based on the characteristics of the COVID-19 virus—“[b]etween 160 million and 214 million
people in the United States could be infected over the course of the epidemic,” and “[a]s many as 200,000
to 1.7 million people could die.” Sheri Fink, Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html
[https://perma.cc/SK8T-LYET]. The overall fatality rate, factoring in demographic and health factors, is
0.3%–3.5%, “which is 5-35 times the fatality associated with influenza infection.” Declaration for Pers.’s
in Det. & Det. Staff, Chris Beyrer, MD, MPH, Professor of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
Sch. of Pub. Health (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with author); see also Nick Wilson et al., Case-Fatality Risk
Estimates for COVID-19 Calculated by Using a Lag Time for Fatality, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASE J. 1339, 1340 (2020) (estimating a “broad range of 0.25%–3.0% for COVID-19 case-fatality
risk estimates”).
11
See Zeke Miller, Government Official: Coronavirus Vaccine Trial Starts Monday, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Mar.
15,
2020),
https://apnews.com/8089a3d0ec8f9fde971bddd7b3aa2ba1
[https://perma.cc/A7NM-Y7RG] (explaining that “[p]ublic health officials say it will take a year to 18
months to fully validate any potential vaccine”); Laura Spinney, When Will a Coronavirus Vaccine Be
Ready?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/06/whenwill-coronavirus-vaccine-be-ready [https://perma.cc/TD7J-6XNZ].
12
Andrew Jacobs, Matt Richtel & Mike Baker, ‘At War with No Ammo’: Doctors Say Shortage of
Protective
Gear
Is
Dire,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/health/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html [https://perma.cc/AW63E44Z].
13
Ken Alltucker & Nick Penzenstadler, Too Many Coronavirus Patients, Too Few Ventilators:
Outlook in US Could Get Bad, Quickly, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:43 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/18/coronavirus-ventilators-us-hospitals-johnshopkins-mayo-clinic/5032523002/ [https://perma.cc/UZH7-HXGD]; Patti Neighmond, As the Pandemic
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all age ranges, adults over sixty and people with chronic medical conditions
are especially vulnerable.14
The nation’s jails carry their own heightened risk.15 Unlike free people,
detainees cannot engage in “‘social distancing’ and ‘self-quarantine’ and
‘flattening the curve’ of the epidemic—all of these things are impossible in
jails . . . or are made worse by the way jails . . . are operated.”16 Inmates in
jails are often housed in large dormitories or shared cells with poor
ventilation. They are denied freedom of movement. They eat in large dining
halls and share shower and toilet facilities. They lack access to adequate
medical care, soap, cleaning supplies, and personal protective equipment like
face masks or gloves.17 In addition, a greater percentage of detainees qualify
as “high risk” for COVID-19 due to age and preexisting health conditions
than the general population.18 Each of these factors compound the risk for
infection, severe symptoms, and death. Moreover, these facilities are not
closed environments. Every day, across the nation, staff come to jails, and
every day, at the end of their shifts, they return home to their families and
communities.19 Additionally, as courts across the nation reopen, inmates will

Spreads, Will There Be Enough Ventilators?, NPR (Mar. 14, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/14/815675678/as-the-pandemic-spreads-will-therebe-enough-ventilators [https://perma.cc/GB6T-KGV7].
14
People with underlying conditions are also more likely to die from the disease; for example, the
mortality rate for people with cardiovascular disease is 13.2%, 9.2% for those with diabetes, 8.4% for
those with hypertension, 8.0% for those with chronic respiratory disease, and 7.6% for those with cancer.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
(COVID-19) 12 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-jointmission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23CJ-G4UZ]; see also People Who Are at Higher
Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/specific-groups/high-risk-complications.html
[https://perma.cc/V93T-BZ4Y].
15
See, e.g., Miranda Bryant, Coronavirus Spread at Rikers Is a ‘Public Health Disaster’, Says Jail’s
Top Doctor, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020, 10:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/apr/01/rikers-island-jail-coronavirus-public-health-disaster [https://perma.cc/DV6D-ZH5F]
(estimating the rate of infection in New York City jails at 3.91% compared to the total New York City
population at 0.5%); Megan Crepeau & Jason Meisner, Cook County Jail Detainee Dies of COVID-19,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-cook-countyjail-death-20200406-42b3dkcqsbeyzflsmso6s2j4wi-story.html [https://perma.cc/3M6V-F534] (reporting
234 detainees infected at Cook County Jail).
16
Jennifer Gonnerman, How Prisons and Jails Can Respond to the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-prisons-and-jails-can-respond-to-thecoronavirus [https://perma.cc/5TAQ-AH6P]. Homer Venters, former Chief Medical Officer of Rikers,
explained that “it’s going to be very, very difficult to deliver a standard of care either in the detection or
the treatment of people who are behind bars.” Id.
17
See infra note 100.
18
See infra note 85.
19
See Cary Johnson, As a Mom Working in a Prison, I Worry About Bringing Coronavirus Home,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/01/as-a-
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leave jails for court appearances, meet with their attorneys and court staff,
and then return.20 These realities create an opportunity for COVID-19 to
enter a facility and, once present, to spread to those who are incarcerated and
all who have had contact with them. The Marion Correctional Institution in
Ohio offers a chilling case study: An estimated 80% of the detained
population has tested positive for COVID-19, and health experts warn that
the contagion has begun to spread to the communities surrounding the prison
where guards and other staff live.21
In many ways, the current COVID-19 crisis has revealed a criminal
justice system that has always been broken and always teetered on the edge
of some disaster. U.S. jails were particularly susceptible to contagions even
before COVID-19.22 These were not their only problems, though other
problems from overcrowding to overpolicing to lack of reentry programs
have contributed to this susceptibility. A discussion of each of these issues
is beyond the scope of this brief Essay. Instead, this Essay focuses on the
pretrial detention system and how the issues with it are exacerbated by the
current pandemic.
Part I of this Essay considers the pretrial detention system outside of
the context of the current crisis. Part II discusses the impact of COVID-19
on the pretrial detention system and raises the question of what endemic
flaws this moment of crisis might reveal. It concludes that with or without a
COVID-19 crisis, the pretrial detention system fundamentally miscalculates
safety by failing to account for risks to defendants during periods of
incarceration and by pitting defendants’ interests against the very

mom-working-in-a-prison-i-worry-about-bringing-coronavirus-home
[https://perma.cc/RW5SMWUM].
20
See Jacqueline Thomsen, Judiciary Prepares for Gradual Reopening During COVID-19, but Tells
Courts
to
Heed
Local
Officials,
LAW.COM
(Apr.
27,
2020,
7:32
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/04/27/judiciary-prepares-for-gradual-reopening-duringcovid-19-but-tells-courts-to-heed-local-officials/
[https://perma.cc/JG95-E4Z3]
(describing
the
resumption of in-person court appearances in federal courts). Inmates and jail staff are not the only
vulnerable populations. In Los Angeles, a public defender who contracted COVID-19 after meeting with
clients has died. Matt Hamilton, Los Angeles County Public Defender Dies from COVID-19, L.A. TIMES
(May 28, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-28/los-angeles-countypublic-defender-dies-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/56BB-YD97].
21
See Sarah Volpenhein, Marion Prison Coronavirus Outbreak Seeping into Larger Community,
MARION
STAR
(Apr.
25,
2020,
4:16
PM),
https://www.marionstar.com/story/news/local/2020/04/25/marion-prison-ohio-coronavirus-outbreakseeping-into-larger-community/3026133001/ [https://perma.cc/S9AZ-MPKT].
22
Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1047,
1047 (2007). For scientific reports on specific contagions in jails and prisons, see Scientific Reports &
MMWRs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/correctionalhealth/SRMMWR.html [https://perma.cc/4EVQ-KSJU].
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communities that depend on them.23 The current public health crisis
demonstrates in stark terms the interconnected nature of a defendant’s and
the community’s safety interests. This, in turn, implicates not only due
process concerns regarding the protection of the detainees’ fundamental
liberty interests, but also Eighth Amendment concerns about the burdens of
pretrial detention in the face of a public health crisis and beyond.
I.

THE TROUBLE WITH PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE BEST OF TIMES

Even during the best of times, the nation’s pretrial detention system has
been the subject of repeated criticism and reform movements.24 The
Constitution references pretrial detention only once, prohibiting excessive
bail in the Eighth Amendment.25 Despite this singular reference, other
components of due process—such as the presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof—implicate and support pretrial release. Historically pretrial
release was the default,26 and the original purpose of bail was to ensure the
defendant’s presence in court at future proceedings.27 Time and bail reform
expanded that purpose to focus on the nature of the offense alleged and, later,
on whether or not the defendant posed a risk to the community if released
pretrial.28
These entwined considerations—flight risk and future dangerousness—
make up the modern pretrial release calculation. And, except for defendants
who are statutorily ineligible for pretrial release,29 courts can only impose
pretrial conditions on a defendant upon a finding that it is necessary to
mitigate the risk identified by the state.30 Determining when release is
23

See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 599–606 (2017)
(describing community bail fund organizing efforts).
25
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
26
See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 33 (providing that “bail shall be admitted[] except where
the punishment may be death”); SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE
LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (2018) (noting that denying bail in
noncapital cases was historically seen as a denial of the presumption of innocence).
27
See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (explaining that “[a] recognizance of bail, in a
criminal case, is taken to secure the due attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to
submit to a trial, and the judgment of the court thereon”).
28
This shift began in earnest in the 1940s and progressed through the 1980s with the passage of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739–43 (1987); Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 253 (1984); BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 19–27.
29
See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
30
See id. at 746–47; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1951); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION
STANDARDS:
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
STANDARD
10-1.2
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2002),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/cri
mjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk/ [https://perma.cc/2THN-5Y8C] (explaining how courts should
undergo pretrial release decisions). This is not to say that courts are the only actors who may affect pretrial
24
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appropriate and what that release will look like is a multistep predictive
balancing act.
Courts first weigh the defendant’s liberty interests against the state’s
prediction of flight risk or dangerousness if the defendant were to be
permitted to remain free while awaiting trial.31 To do this, courts use
predictive proxies to determine the probability that the defendant will pose a
risk if released and to determine what conditions, if any, might mitigate that
risk.32 Increasingly, courts rely on pretrial assessment tools (PSAs) to
calculate this probability.33 Like their human counterparts, PSA
determinations attempt to predict future behavior based on known and
knowable information such as the nature of the alleged offense, the
defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s ties to the community as
evidenced by work history or residence, and the defendant’s criminal
history.34 Courts are then left to balance the defendant’s interest in freedom
against the predicted risks the defendant poses if released pretrial. The
process is imperfect at best and catastrophic at worst.
Moreover, though financial incentives and constitutional and statutory
mandates should minimize pretrial detention, there is a disconnect between
the articulated goals of the system and the reality of how it works. High rates
release decisions. As noted, legislators may designate particular offenses or defendants as ineligible for
bail. In addition, discretionary decisions by police, sheriffs, and prosecutors may also affect pretrial
detention. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2017).
31
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f) (2012).
32
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 865–
71.
33
Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61 (2017); Megan Stevenson,
Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 344–45 (2018). These PSAs utilize
algorithms to determine the probability that a defendant will either fail to appear or pose a danger if
released. See Eaglin, supra, at 64; Stevenson, supra, at 304–05. Risk assessment tools were originally
touted as decreasing the influence of bias in pretrial decision-making, yet, as will be discussed next, recent
critiques of such tools suggest that they promote the very bias they were designed to eliminate. See, e.g.,
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019) (arguing that predictive
techniques are inherently unequal and racialized).
34
Kate Patrick, Arnold Foundation to Roll Out Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Nationwide, INSIDE
SOURCES (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.insidesources.com/arnold-foundation-to-roll-out-pretrial-riskassessment-tool-nationwide/ [https://perma.cc/GA4B-TYYQ]. These factors are consistent with those
used by courts in making pretrial detention decisions. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131 (explaining that
“the court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the penalty provided by
law; the weight of the evidence against the defendant . . . the defendant’s past and present conduct,
including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court
proceedings; the nature and probability of danger that the defendant’s release poses to the community;
[and] the source of funds used to post bail”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 (providing that “the bail authority shall
consider all available information as that information is relevant to the defendant’s appearance or
nonappearance at subsequent proceedings, or compliance or noncompliance with the conditions of the
bail bond, including information about:” the nature of the offense, the defendant’s employment, the
defendant’s ties to the community, and whether the defendant complied with the relevant conditions).
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of pretrial detention contribute to jail and prison overcrowding35 and strain
county and community resources that are often stretched perilously thin
already.36 The following Sections will, in turn, discuss the due process
concerns, inherent biases, and problematic downstream consequences that
make the problem worse. Though COVID-19 has certainly exacerbated
issues inherent in the pretrial detention system, the system was deeply flawed
from the start. In many ways, the current public health crisis has simply laid
bare the troubling and devastating reality of a broken system.
A. The Due Process Problems with Pretrial Hearings
The Supreme Court has required a nexus between the state’s articulated
interest and its proposed condition of release or detention in federal pretrial
detention hearings.37 Under this rule, if a federal court makes a finding that
a defendant poses a flight risk or presents a danger to the community if
released, it can set conditions necessary to mitigate that risk without running
afoul of the Due Process Clause.38
The problem with this due process analysis is multifaceted. Setting
aside the question of whether federal due process analysis is even applicable
to state pretrial detention hearings, such hearings—including those in federal
courts—lack many of the robust procedural safeguards of a trial.39 These
hearings tend to be remarkably short—often less than two minutes in
length—and, in state court, may occur prior to appointment of counsel for a
35

Margaret Elizabeth Sparks, Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail
Systems and Their Continued Use Throughout the United States, 52 GA. L. REV. 983, 1004 (2018)
(explaining that pretrial detainment leads to “the overcrowding of jails”). Pretrial detainees are more
likely accept a plea deal than a released defendant. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson,
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14
(2017). Pretrial detention also likely worsens case outcomes by hindering the defendant’s ability to
prepare his defense. Id.
36
Alexi Jones, Does Our County Really Need a Bigger Jail?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailexpansion.html [https://perma.cc/S5S4-UPEY]; Natalie Ortiz,
Pretrial Population and Costs Put County Jails at a Crossroads, NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES (June 29,
2015),
https://www.naco.org/articles/pretrial-population-and-costs-put-county-jails-crossroads-0
[https://perma.cc/PR8V-ZZ76].
37
See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). While the Court has established
process requirements in the context of federal proceedings, it has provided little guidance as to whether
or not such protections are also constitutionally mandated for state systems. Kellen Funk, The Present
Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1098, 1107 (2019).
38
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–52.
39
See BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 109; Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial
Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1353–55 (2012);
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 428 (2011). This is not
to say the defendant enjoys no procedural protections, but it is to say that these protections are
significantly curtailed at the pretrial detention stage. See Appleman, supra, at 1353–55.
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defendant.40 The absence of counsel and the brevity of these hearings raises
significant questions regarding the level of rigor courts employ in
considering whether to impose detention.41
Arguably, the actuarial analysis of PSAs has rendered such brief
hearings sufficient. PSAs, after all, offer an efficient analysis of probable
risks.42 Such an argument, however, overlooks the reality of how PSAs
actually work. PSAs are static in their analysis and susceptible to economic
and racial bias.43 They fail to account for voices outside of their constructed
consideration and they assign a permanent meaning to factors they consider
without context.44 To PSAs, a criminal history signals danger, rather than
hard times, hopelessness, or police harassment,45 and a failure to appear
signals a flight risk, rather than competing obligations or the lack of
economic resources that render missed work a financial catastrophe rather
than a mere inconvenience.46 While PSAs may represent an efficient means
to collect data and assign it some meaning, they cannot and should not
replace human analysis and the context human analysis can provide.
Alternatively, one might argue that a brief and unrepresented pretrial
hearing—even one that lacks procedural protections and fails to fully
consider risks and the potential mitigation of those risks—is sufficient given
the brevity of pretrial detention. Such an argument assumes that speedy trial
clocks will indeed limit periods of pretrial detention.47 This assumption is
belied by the reality that modern pretrial detention periods often extend to
nearly a year and are sometimes longer than, or as long as, any sentence
imposed.48

40

See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 37 (2019); Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn
Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2002) (observing that pretrial detention hearings in Baltimore City
with counsel lasted “on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus one minute [and] fortyseven seconds without counsel”).
41
See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21–32 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Dorothy Weldon,
More Appealing: Reforming Bail Review in State Courts, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2401, 2420–21 (2018).
42
Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305.
43
See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2259; Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305.
44
Stevenson, supra note 33, at 314–17.
45
See id. at 317–18.
46
See id.
47
See 130 CONG. REC. 1821 (1984) (statement of Senator Grassley) (noting that the Speedy Trial
Act would prevent lengthy periods of pretrial detention); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 677, 739 n.310 (2018).
48
See PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS
OF
BAIL
AND
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
5
(2018),
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Another problem with this due process analysis is that defendants often
operate at a distinct disadvantage in pretrial proceedings. Prior to making a
charging decision, the state, through police investigation, has had the
opportunity to amass evidence that a newly charged defendant has not.49 This
not only means that a defendant, even one represented by counsel, will be at
a distinct disadvantage, but also that the prosecutor assumes an outsized role
once she makes a decision to charge a defendant. This is because both PSAs
and courts rely on the prosecutor’s allegation or charge as a factor to guide
pretrial risk calculations.50 Defense counsel, if present, may refute an
allegation; however, fear of self-incrimination may counsel against robust
defense participation—especially if defense counsel has had little time to
speak to the defendant prior to the pretrial hearing. Further, if the prosecutor
can establish probable cause exists for a charge that precludes bail, the
prosecutor can literally control the bail proceedings through charging
discretion.51 And once a pretrial detention decision is made, federal and state
procedural rules often preclude reconsideration of detention or the conditions
of release absent a demonstration of a change in circumstances not apparent
at the time of the original determination.52
Finally, pretrial detention often occurs not because of a genuine risk of
flight or future dangerousness, but because a defendant is unable to satisfy
conditions of release. A defendant may lack the money for bail.53 Or they
may be unable to comply with nonmonetary conditions of release because
they lack funds for electronic home monitoring (EHM), access to mental
health or substance counseling, or stable housing located a sufficient distance
from a complaining witness.54 In making a finding that some condition will
sufficiently mitigate the risk the defendant poses, courts may permit pretrial
release upon satisfaction of the conditions.55
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/BailFineReform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MQ3-NFTS].
49
See BAZELON, supra note 40, at 37.
50
See supra note 33.
51
One could argue that it is the legislature, not the prosecutor, controlling this aspect of pretrial
decision-making. And, in part, that is true. However, given that prosecutors frequently choose between
and among charges as part of permissible (and even desirable) prosecutorial charging discretion, it is
more accurate to consider such legislative designations as merely creating opportunities for prosecutorial
control of the pretrial detention process.
52
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (providing a judge may reopen a pretrial detention question
only when there is new evidence that is material to the decision of whether detention is appropriate).
Admittedly, COVID-19 might constitute such a new condition.
53
Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1652–53 (2020).
54
Jenny E. Carroll, Beyond Bail, 73 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33–34) (on file
with author).
55
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(B)(iv), 3146 (permitting restrictions on travel to prevent flight
risk); id. § 3142(g) (permitting courts to set conditions of release to mitigate risk to the community).
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However, the courts often engage in little consideration of the
defendant’s ability to meet the conditions—monetary or otherwise.56 In other
words, a defendant may be held pretrial not because they pose some
insurmountable risk, but because they are too poor to meet the conditions of
their release or because resources, such as treatment beds or secure housing,
do not exist for them. Thus, in practice, the balance of risk required by due
process is superseded by structural barriers that are unrelated to the
defendant’s supposed flight risk or dangerousness.
B. Bias
Accusations of bias in the criminal justice system are neither new nor
unique to pretrial detention.57 Overpolicing of poor and minority populations;
disproportionate rates of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions; and inequity
in sentencing all translate into higher rates of pretrial and posttrial detention
among marginal populations.58 Bias by early decision-makers fuel these high
rates of detention.59
Bias in pretrial decision-making has long been the subject of critique.60
Early pretrial detention reformers argued that judicial discretion increased
detention rates among poor and minority defendants because judges often
failed to consider indigency, and so they often set bail and conditions of
release that marginal defendants could not meet.61 These early reformers
56

Carroll, supra note 54, at 28–29.
See, e.g., Edward Green, Race, Social Status, and Criminal Arrest, 35 AM. SOC. REV. 476, 476–
77 (1970) (describing bias in arrest rates between 1942 and 1965).
58
See Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1185–87
(2012).
59
See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 200–10
(2013). It is also worth noting that each early actor may not engage in decision-making equally. Judges
may defer to police and prosecutors in assessing risk, either explicitly in the form of hearings that
emphasize evidence in support of the charge, or implicitly as the relationship between pretrial hearing
judges and law enforcement fosters reliance. The Supreme Court has urged court deference to police in
the Fourth Amendment context, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and scholars have noted such a
deference in the context of credibility assessments. See, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption
of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2017). Additionally, rules of procedure often promote
deference to prosecutorial decision-making by requiring or allowing courts to consider both present and
past charges in making pretrial detention decisions. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 (providing that “the
bail authority shall consider all available information as that information is relevant to the defendant’s
appearance or nonappearance at subsequent proceedings, or compliance or noncompliance with the
conditions of the bail bond, including information about:” the nature of the offense, the defendant’s
employment, the defendant’s ties to the community, and whether the defendant complied with the relevant
conditions).
60
In the 1960s, the Vera Institute argued that judges in New York City were overdetaining poor and
minority defendants based on miscalculations of the risk that they would fail to appear at future court
dates. See WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 2–11 (1976).
61
Id.
57
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argued that courts could reduce bias by analyzing a series of known factors,
such as criminal history and community ties, that could assess the risk a
defendant might pose if released with reasonable accuracy.62 They argued
that, through this method, unnecessary conditions including bail could be
avoided and release rates would increase.63 The wide adoption of these
proposed reforms—including the Bail Reform Act of 1966—led to
increasing rates of pretrial release, but the shift was short-lived.64 The 1980s,
with the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and its state analogs, saw
another reversal in pretrial policy with a renewed embrace of money bail and
outright detention of individuals pretrial.65 Since then, rates of pretrial
detention across the nation have continued to rise and to disproportionately
affect poor and minority populations.66
In response, actuarial risk assessment tools were introduced to reduce
arbitrary and inaccurate calculations of risk by decreasing the amount of
discretion in pretrial release decisions.67 Such tools generate a risk
assessment score for each defendant, which is then used by a court, or the
legislature, to set the criteria for release.68 A defendant who receives a low
score is unlikely to pose either a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the
community and may be released. In contrast, a defendant who receives a high
score may pose a greater risk and merit detention.69 By shifting pretrial
assessments away from judges toward machine-generated evaluations,
advocates hoped the bias that had long plagued pretrial detention processes
would be mitigated. It was not.
Despite the promise of accurate and neutral findings, risk assessment
tools quickly displayed the same bias as the system they sought to improve.70
There are different possible explanations for these results: The PSAs may

62

Id.
Id. at 20–22.
64
BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 23–25.
65
Id. at 25–26.
66
See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventative Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 515 (1986); Baradaran, supra note 59, at 184–85,
193.
67
Gouldin, supra note 47, at 713; see also text accompanying notes 42–46 (discussing how these
risk assessment tools work).
68
Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 494–95 (2018).
69
For a discussion of how risk scores are calculated and the significance of risk scores, see BUREAU
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1
(2010).
70
See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Mayson, supra note 68, at 508–10; Stevenson, supra note
33, at 344–45.
63
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carry their own embedded biases71 or they may be susceptible to user bias
through inconsistent interpretation of risk assessment scores.72 Coupled with
the lack of information about how such scores are generated, these risk
assessment tools have done little to mitigate inherent biases in the pretrial
detention process.73 In the end, despite multiple reform movements, poor and
minority defendants are still more likely to be subjected to pretrial
detention.74
C. The Downstream Consequences of Pretrial Detention
Even in the best of times, the line between pretrial detention and
punishment has always been a murky one. While the Supreme Court has
repeatedly drawn a boundary between detention that punishes and detention
which merely promotes compelling state interests prior to trial,75 significant
downstream consequences of even brief periods of pretrial detention render
the practice effectively punitive.76
In custody prior to trial, accused people not only suffer the “ordinary”
indignities of jail, they also lose wages, homes, child custody, and the
opportunity to meaningfully assist in their own defense.77 They are also are
less likely to receive mental health and addiction treatment and are more
likely to plead guilty to their charges.78 These downstream consequences of
pretrial detention affect the defendants as well as their communities. The
community a defendant leaves behind during pretrial detention not only loses
one of its own, but also loses all of the benefits of that defendant’s presence.
In custody, defendants do not earn a wage to support their families or pay
their rent. They are absentee parents, partners, and mentors. Whatever

71
See Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Mayson, supra note 68, at 508–10; Stevenson, supra note
33, at 344–45.
72
See Stevenson, supra note 33, at 305, 327–33.
73
See Eaglin, supra note 33, at 94–97; Mayson, supra note 33, at 2251–54; Julia Angwin et al.,
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/9G99-E83U].
74
See Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct.
9, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ [https://perma.cc/MC7J-B639].
75
See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 747–48 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
76
See BAUGHMAN, supra note 26, at 82–91; Heaton et al., supra note 35, at 713–14; Crystal S. Yang,
Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417–27 (2017).
77
Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 53 GA. L. REV. 235, 241, 246–47, 277–279
(2018); see also Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/PB6X-5GD2]
(describing the consequences of pretrial detention on poor defendants in New York’s criminal justice
system).
78
See Heaton et al. supra note 35, at 722.
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investment they have made in their community prior to their detention is
halted or limited while detained.
Moreover, pretrial detention serves to disrupt and destroy the very ties
between defendants and their communities that might, in the long run,
protect and promote community safety. In this way, what the Court declines
to refer to as punishment may nonetheless feel punitive to those who suffer
it.79
II.

COVID-19 AND PRETRIAL DETENTION

Whatever failings the pretrial detention system suffers in the best of
times are further complicated by COVID-19. Detention in the face of a
pandemic skews the calculation of the liberty interests at stake and alters
incentives for pretrial actors. In the midst of a public health crisis, pretrial
detention determinations raise more than the possibility of confinement,
indignity, and the downstream consequences described above; these
decisions raise the possibility that a person will be exposed to a known fatal
contagion as a result of an accusation. Beyond this, closures of courts in the
wake of the public health crisis80 raise the specter that speedy trial rights will
no longer serve (if they ever did) as a backstop to indefinite periods of
pretrial detention.81
This Part will discuss each of these issues in turn. Section II.A begins
by explaining why jail populations are more susceptible to contagions,
leading to the conclusion that defendants should be released pretrial rather
than detained. Section II.B then explains how pretrial decision-makers fail
to adequately weigh defendants’ liberty and safety interests in making their
detention decisions, using COVID-19 as a lens through which to show how
fundamentally flawed these pretrial detention calculations are. Section II.C
builds upon this discussion by arguing that the calculation also
misunderstands the community’s interests in pretrial release. Altogether,
these complications suggest that an alternative calculation of pretrial
detention is necessary—a calculation that recognizes that pretrial release
may in fact promote public safety.

79

See Appleman, supra note 39, at 1336; Carroll, supra note 54, at 12.
Jacob Gershman & Byron Tau, Coronavirus Disrupts U.S. Court System; Trials Are Delayed and
Courthouses Are Limiting Public Access Across the Country, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-disrupts-u-s-court-system-11584445222
[https://perma.cc/QD2S-KPVU].
81
See Simone Weichselbaum, Can’t Make Bail, Sit in Jail Even Longer Thanks to Coronavirus,
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/can-tmake-bail-sit-in-jail-even-longer-thanks-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/4SWR-CSB8].
80
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A. Jails and Contagions
Even before the current health crisis, the conditions of the nation’s jails
and prisons rendered their occupants susceptible to contagions in ways that
members of the free world were not.82 Jails and prisons are infamous for
overcrowding and lack of medical care.83 In 2016, the DOJ issued two reports
on the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) confirming these concerns in federal prisons,
finding that BOP experienced chronic medical staff shortages and failed to
take adequate measures to address them.84
In many ways, local jails fare worse when it comes to medical care and
contagion control. First, jails are composed of pretrial detainees and
individuals on parole or probation violation holds, which means that jail
populations fluctuate more than prison populations as inmates move in and
out of the facilities.85 Second, “the [healthcare] crisis is particularly acute in
jails” as those booked into jail often enter in a state of medical or emotional
distress and may require monitoring or specialized care that jails lack the
resources to provide.86 The proliferation of private jail management that

82

Bick, supra note 22, at 1047.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICES FOR THE
NORTHERN, MIDDLE, AND SOUTHERN DISTS. OF ALA., INVESTIGATION OF ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS
FOR
MEN
8–12
(2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1150276/download
[https://perma.cc/EZ5C-SUU4] [hereinafter ALABAMA NOTICE] (noting chronic overcrowding in
Alabama prisons); Glenn Ellis, Examining Health Care in U.S. Prisons, PHILA. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/examining-health-care-in-u-s-prisons/article_43520055-789e-52a9aed5-eaf1c75c7c36.html [https://perma.cc/FAP8-ZRKB]; see also Talha Burki, Prisons Are “In No Way
Equipped” to Deal with COVID-19, 395 LANCET 1411, 1412 (May 2, 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930984-3
[https://perma.cc/S2A9-WEHX] (explaining how jails and prisons are unprepared to cope with the
medical needs of prisoners during the COVID-19 pandemic); Laura Hawks, Steffie Woolhandler &
Danny McCormick, COVID-19 in Prisons and Jails in the United States, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Apr.
28,
2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2765271
[https://perma.cc/TU5S-TKXN] (same).
84
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ MEDICAL STAFFING CHALLENGES (2016). This deficiency led to problems meeting the medical
needs of prisoners. Id. The DOJ also reported that BOP facilities and services, including medical services,
were particularly inadequate to meet the needs of an aging prison population. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF PRISONS (2016). State prison facilities fare no better. See, e.g., ALABAMA NOTICE, supra note 83, at
1, 8–9.
85
Steve Coll, The Jail Health-Care Crisis, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/the-jail-health-care-crisis [https://perma.cc/Y5XEV3NN]; Lipi Roy, Infections and Incarceration: Why Jails and Prisons Need to Prepare for COVID-19
Now, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lipiroy/2020/03/11/infectionsand-incarceration-why-jails-and-prisons-need-to-prepare-for-covid-19-stat/#1fa6b08e49f3
[https://perma.cc/JQ6P-X2M2].
86
Coll, supra note 85.
83
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prioritizes profit over care has heightened this problem.87 A 2019 CNN
exposé of one such management company reported that, “[a]cross the
country, the same themes have been found: doctors and nurses [in jails] have
failed to diagnose and monitor life-threatening illnesses and chronic
diseases . . . allow[ing] common infections and conditions to become
fatal.”88 The result is “prolonged suffering, ongoing complications, shortened
life expectancy and debt” among jail populations.89 Publicly managed jails
suffer similar deficiencies. For example, in 2018, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) declared the medical program at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail
unconstitutional.90 The report noted that inmate requests for medical care
were ignored or not taken seriously by jail staff, resulting in serious harm or
death.91
In turn, this lack of medical care within jail facilities taxes local
communities. Inmates, unable to receive adequate medical care in jail, may
present at local hospitals for emergency treatment.92 Jails, unable or
unwilling to bear the financial burden of treatment, may also release inmates
untreated, burdening already strained local communities.93
Contagions compound problems created by inadequate medical care. In
jail, detainees share spaces such as toilets, laundry, and meal facilities.94 The
close and shared quarters render social distancing impossible, allowing
infections to spread more easily.95 Poor air circulation,96 high rates of older
and medically compromised individuals,97 the treatment of hand sanitizer as

87

See Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, ‘PLEASE HELP ME Before it’s Too Late,’ CNN (June 25,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/us/jail-health-care-ccs-invs/ [https://perma.cc/3JAGJU9D].
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE EASTERN DIST. OF VA.,
NOTICE REGARDING INVESTIGATION OF THE HAMPTON ROAD REGIONAL JAIL (PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA)
1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1121221/download [https://perma.cc/PA3LAW48].
91
Id. at 1, 6.
92
See, e.g., Coll, supra note 85.
93
See id.
94
Burki, supra note 83, at 1411.
95
Gonnerman, supra note 16.
96
Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction Continues,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion/coronavirus-in-jails.html
[https://perma.cc/Y246-XM2Z].
97
Gonnerman, supra note 16.
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contraband,98 and the lack of access to personal hygiene or sanitizing
products99 all further susceptibility to infection.
Lack of medical care and contagion-friendly environments in jails are
troubling in the best of times; in the face of the current health care crisis these
circumstances combine to create a high-risk roulette in which inmates,
unable to practice best the preventative guidelines, await infection and, for
some, death.
Practitioners, activists, and scholars across the nation have renewed
their call for detention reform in light of the current COVID-19 crisis.100 The
response has been mixed. While some jurisdictions have failed to release
inmates,101 others have released those close to the completion of their
sentences, those held as a result of administrative probation or parole
violations (such as failure to make curfew, failure to check in with a parole
or probation officer, or failure to pay a fine), and those detained for
nonviolent or misdemeanor offenses.102 For example, six counties in North
98
Roy, supra note 85 (explaining that “[h]and sanitizers [] are often considered contraband because
they contain alcohol”).
99
See Bick, supra note 22, at 1047.
100
See, e.g., Hannah Cox, Coronavirus Will Turn Our Prisons into Death Zones Without Reform,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Mar.
17,
2020,
12:02
PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/coronavirus-will-turn-our-prisons-into-death-zoneswithout-reform [https://perma.cc/Y9MD-RAN4]; Nancy Gertner & John Reinstein, Compassionate
Release Now for Prisoners Vulnerable to the Coronavirus, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/23/opinion/compassionate-release-now-prisoners-vulnerablecoronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/6NXP-VLTJ]; Peter Wagner & Emily Widra, No Need to Wait for
Pandemics: The Public Health Case for Criminal Justice Reform, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 6,
2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/06/pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/5743-G5H8].
101
See, e.g., Andrea Woods, Dallas County Officials Are Leaving Vulnerable People to Catch
COVID-19 in Jail, ACLU (May 12, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/prisoners-rights/dallas-countyofficials-are-leaving-vulnerable-people-to-catch-covid-19-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/689V-CJQQ]. This
is occurring not only at the local jail level, but at the federal level as well. While Attorney General Barr
“asked the [BOP] to identify and release all inmates who were eligible for home confinement, no longer
posed a threat to the public and were particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus,” citing the “emergency
conditions” created by COVID-19 as the impetus for his request in March, he has also faced recent
criticism for secret policies that made release more difficult. Katie Benner, Barr Expands Early Release
of Inmates at Prisons Seeing More Coronavirus Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/politics/barr-coronavirus-prisons-release.html
[https://perma.cc/F739-HJG6]; Ian MacDougall, Bill Barr Promised to Release Prisoners Threatened by
Coronavirus—Even as the Feds Secretly Made it Harder for Them to Get Out, PROPUBLICA (May 26,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/bill-barr-promised-to-release-prisoners-threatenedby-coronavirus-even-as-the-feds-secretly-made-it-harder-for-them-to-get-out [https://perma.cc/Q6ZZ9JN5].
102
See, e.g., NYC MAYOR’S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK CITY JAIL POPULATION
REDUCTION IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020), http://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/MOCJ-COVID-19-Jail-Reduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ACH4-M8HT]
(breaking down release data for New York City); Cheryl Corley, The COVID-19 Struggle in Chicago’s
Cook County Jail, NPR (Apr. 13, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/13/833440047/the-
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Carolina affirmed that they will release detainees charged with “low-level
offenses” after an individual review confirming that “release does not
constitute a public safety concern.”103 Still other jurisdictions have adopted
“cite and release”104 or non-policing policies with regard to nonviolent
misdemeanors.105 Finally, some have offered alternative forms of detention,
including release to a family member, house arrest, or EHM.106
District attorneys have also weighed in on the debate. Some have voiced
support for these temporary reforms, hailing them as an appropriate balance
between law enforcement and public health.107 Others have been less
supportive—urging aggressive policing,108 seeking continuances in pending
criminal cases while opposing pretrial release,109 and advocating that certain

covid-19-struggle-in-chicagos-cook-county-jail [https://perma.cc/P6BW-HNBB] (describing release
considerations for Cook County jails). For data on release rates across multiple institutions, see
Monitoring Jail Populations During COVID-19, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/projects/covid19-criminal-justice-responses/covid-19-data [https://perma.cc/G3KG-4UE5].
103
Jordan Wilkie, UPDATED: Coronavirus Raises Health, Legal Concerns for NC Jails, CAROLINA
PUB. PRESS (Mar. 20, 2020), https://carolinapublicpress.org/30039/coronavirus-raises-health-legalconcerns-for-nc-jails/ [https://perma.cc/J7TM-AH43].
104
A cite and release policy allows a police officer to issue a citation or ticket to an offender in lieu
of arresting him or her. Similarly, nonpolicing policies allow police departments to simply deprioritize
enforcement of some minor offenses. Even if the police are aware that the offense occurred, they will
either decline to investigate it, or decline to arrest the suspected offender. Both policies tend to be limited
in scope—often affecting only misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses—and both reduce pretrial
detention by never placing a suspect within the jail system. A recent example of this was the decision in
New York City to not arrest those suspected of simple possession of marijuana. Benjamin Mueller, New
York Will End Marijuana Arrests for Most People, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/nyregion/nypd-marijuana-arrests-new-york-city.html
[https://perma.cc/JG7X-GLGY].
105
See, e.g., Liz Kellar, Cite and Release, not Jail, for Some over COVID-19 Concerns, UNION (Mar.
18, 2020), https://www.theunion.com/news/cite-and-release-not-jail-for-some-over-covid-19-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/2ZNW-LZAA]; Nichole Manna, Fort Worth Police Will Give Citations for Low-Level
Crimes Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/coronavirus/article241254951.html
[https://perma.cc/7YP8S2A5].
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See, e.g., Lucas Wright, Amy Fleming Now on House Arrest Due to COVID-19, 8 NEWS NOW
(May 1, 2020, 9:16 PM) https://www.8newsnow.com/news/local-news/amy-fleming-now-on-housearrest-due-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/6DLS-JBP3].
107
See, e.g., Coronavirus Latest: Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Urges Leaders to Reduce Prison
Populations Due to COVID-19 Pandemic, CBS NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:29 PM),
https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/03/19/coronavirus-latest-philadelphia-da-larry-krasner-urgesleaders-to-reduce-prison-populations-due-to-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/3SKD-4DBY].
108
See, e.g., Andrew Mark Miller, Police Groups Slam Cities and States Releasing Jail Inmates to
Mitigate
Coronavirus
Fears,
WASH. EXAMINER
(Mar.
21,
2020,
10:43
AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/police-groups-slam-cities-and-states-releasing-jailinmates-to-mitigate-coronavirus-fears [https://perma.cc/SWE6-T6Z4].
109
See, e.g., David J. Mitchell, DA Hillar Moore: State Prosecutors Seeking Orders, Bill to Suspend
Criminal
Legal
Deadlines,
ADVOCATE
(Mar.
16,
2020,
11:31
AM),
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people remain detained because they are less able to comply with CDC
handwashing and social distancing guidelines.110 For their part, federal
district courts have ordered release in the face of overwhelming infection
rates.111
The scope of the crisis within the criminal justice system has become
increasingly apparent as the number of confirmed cases and deaths grow.
Pretrial detainees already make up a disproportionate segment of jail
populations,112 where they face potential exposure to a fatal contagion. In
this, the COVID-19 crisis highlights failures inherent in the determinations
made by the pretrial detention system, most notably the inability to properly
assess the competing interests at stake in determining whether to detain an
individual. In leaving prisoners to the care of the county jail systems,
defendants and their communities are left vulnerable to COVID-19.113
B. Detainees’ Constitutional Interests in the Crisis and Beyond
In making pretrial detention decisions, various actors weigh the interest
of the defendant in pretrial release against the state’s interests in safety,
reducing the risk of flight and, for later pretrial actors, fiscal burdens
associated with detention. This consideration, however, fails to account for
risks a defendant may face in custody, which raises both due process and
Eighth Amendment concerns.114
Turning first to the risks a defendant faces during pretrial detention,
admittedly, the Bail Reform Act and its state law analogs do not specifically
address how public health should affect pretrial detention decisions.115 While
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/coronavirus/article_a74ad19a-67a3-11ea-8bbd57cce1edae6c.html [https://perma.cc/H3TW-AU6R].
110
See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, New Orleans Prosecutors Argue the Coronavirus Is a Reason to
Keep People in Jail, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 4:28 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/neworleans-prosecutors-jail-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/AWQ4-NAC6].
111
See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D. Ohio filed Apr. 22, 2020)
(granting partial habeas relief in the form of release for inmates at the Elkton Federal Correctional
Institution in light of COVID-19).
112
See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551
(2012).
113
The concerns noted above are not the only concerns that arise out of the COVID-19 crisis in the
context of the criminal justice system. From a constitutional perspective, detainees suffer denial of speedy
trial and jury rights, a lack of access to counsel now excluded from jails, and the risk of cruel and unusual
conditions of punishment if detained following conviction. This Essay touches on some of these concerns
briefly, though without the full attention they deserve.
114
While fully unpacking each of these is beyond the scope of this Essay, I can recommend a reading
list for anyone who wants one, but I would start with Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail,
128 YALE L.J.F. 1098 (2019), and Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643
(2020).
115
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (2012).
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lower courts have recognized health and safety claims relating to pretrial
detention in contexts outside of the Excessive Bail Clause,116 the Supreme
Court has provided little guidance as to what conditions of release or
detention might violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment
by creating too great a health or safety risk to a pretrial detainee.117
The Court has, however, provided guidance regarding the health and
safety risks to detainees in other contexts. For instance, the Court has
employed the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit “barbarous punishment.”118 This includes prohibiting
prison officials from failing to provide medical care,119 behaving with
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates,120 or knowingly
exposing inmates to serious and communicable diseases.121 At their core,
these cases recognize that even during periods of incarceration, the detainee
maintains an interest in safety from physical harm.122

116
Miranda v. County of Lake arguably comes closest to addressing cruelty in the context of pretrial
detention. 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). In Miranda, the court recognized a claim brought by the estate
of Lyvita Gomes, who was detained for failing to report for jury duty. Id. at 341. During her confinement,
Ms. Gomes refused to eat or drink, and jail medical officials simply monitored her in her cell as she grew
increasingly weaker. Id. By the time she was transported to the hospital, her condition was beyond
treatment, and she died of dehydration. Id. at 341–42. The court allowed the claim to go forward under
the post-conviction line of cases despite the fact that Ms. Gomes was a pretrial detainee. Id.
117
The Court has tied the analysis of “excessiveness” to the Due Process Clause, finding that bail
(or more accurately the lack of bail) is neither excessive nor punitive so long as the decision to detain is
reasonably related to the an articulated and compelling state interest, a point reiterated by Justice Scalia
in his Kingsley v. Hendrickson dissent. 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)) (explaining that “if the condition of confinement being challenged
‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment’”). In Bell, the Court also noted that if
extreme overcrowding amounts to punishment, that too might violate a pretrial detainee’s liberty interests.
441 U.S. at 535.
118
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). In Estelle, the Court recognized an inmate’s civil
rights claim after he was denied adequate medical care following an injury sustained while “performing
[his] prison work assignment.” Id. at 98. In drawing this analogy, I recognize that the Court has indicated
that bail is not meant to be a punishment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding
that pretrial detention does not violate the Fifth or Eighth Amendments); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (holding
that pretrial detention may not be punitive).
119
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
120
Id. at 104.
121
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In Helling, the Court recognized McKinney’s claim
that the prison’s failure to protect him from environmental tobacco smoke violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by posing an unreasonable risk to his health.
Id. at 35.
122
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737–38 (2002). In Hope, the Court held that handcuffing Hope
to a hitching post for prolonged periods of time constituted cruel and unusual punishment not only
because it failed to promote any penological purpose, but because it demonstrated that the prison officials
acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmates’ health or safety.” Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
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While this may not obligate the state to provide optimal medical care,
the state may not ignore the medical needs of detainees, particularly critical
medical protection.123 In Brown v. Plata, the Court explained that a prisoner
“may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A prison that
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized
society.”124 The current crisis brings the Court’s reasoning directly into play.
For detainees who are not outwardly sick, adequate medical care means
having the ability to abide by social distancing and isolation guidelines,
having the ability to wash their hands frequently and carefully, and having
access to medical professionals to assess the severity of potential
symptoms.125 It also means access to protective face masks, as the CDC has
recommended all people wear face masks when social distancing guidelines
cannot be met.126 For those who are experiencing severe symptoms, it means
access to adequate medical professionals, hospitals, and perhaps even
ventilators.127 Thus, while punishment may infringe on a detainee’s personal
liberty, the infringement must not include exposure to contagions or denial
of medical care.128 While Brown v. Plata involves punishment as opposed to
pretrial detention, it would seem odd that a detainee should have more rights
after conviction than before. Rather it seems clear that a pretrial detainee,
like post-conviction detainees, has a liberty interest in physical safety during
periods of pretrial detention.129
Certainly, detainees held as flight risks as opposed to those considered
unsafe should be eligible for release, as concern that a defendant will not
return to a future court date cannot and should not outweigh the detainee’s

123

See id.
563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011).
125
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IF YOU ARE SICK (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/sick-with-2019-nCoV-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HKW9-T2GY].
126
Recommendation Regarding the Use of Cloth Face Covers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover.html
[https://perma.cc/RFK3-EQ4L].
127
Coronavirus: What Are Ventilators and Why Are They Important?, BBC (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52036948 [https://perma.cc/J5ME-MXJ5].
128
The key point is that if we recognize these rights post-conviction, surely they also hold for
individuals who have not yet been convicted.
129
Pretrial detainees’ Eighth Amendment protections are, perhaps, less expansive than one might
expect, but their liberty interest is greater. The Court’s decision in Salerno confirms this, holding that
there is a higher standard for detention when depriving pretrial detainees of liberty (by, say, moving them
to solitary confinement or taking away privileges) than there is when depriving prisoners of the same
liberty. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
124
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liberty interest in remaining alive and healthy.130 This argument seems
particularly salient in light of overwhelming infection rates present in jail
facilities.131 In many jails, infection rates remain obscure due to lack of
testing.132 Still, new cases in jails appear daily.133 As the Court has noted in
the context of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, detention facilities must accommodate the basic human need of
reasonable safety.134 For many detained in jails across the country, such a
reasonable guarantee of safety is impossible during this pandemic.
To be sure, questions about pretrial release in the face of COVID-19
raise broader logistical questions. Not all pretrial detainees are the same—
some pose different levels of risk in terms of safety or flight, and some have
few resources that might ensure their own safety upon release. These
differences, however, can be addressed in terms of the release decisions
themselves and conditions of release. Some jurisdictions have limited release
to those accused of nonviolent offenses or have placed conditions on release,
including home monitoring, curfew requirements, or maintaining residence
in a particular jurisdiction.135
Discussion of release in the time of COVID-19 also highlights a more
fundamental issue—the lack of support services for marginalized individuals
regardless of a health care epidemic. As courts purport to base release
decisions on factors such as a detainee’s ability to return to employment,
130

See, e.g., United States v. Adams, No. 6:19-mj-00087-MK, 2019 WL 3037042, at *1, *3 (D. Or.
July 10, 2019) (holding that a defendant charged with violation of the Mann Act and possession of child
pornography who suffered from diabetes, heart conditions, and open sores should be released on home
detention because of his medical conditions); United States v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88, 90 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that a defendant with AIDS who was charged with murder should be released on bail
given the “unacceptably high risk of infection and death on a daily basis inside the MCC”).
131
See Bryant, supra note 15; Crepeau & Meisner, supra note 15 (describing infections rates at
Riker’s Island and Cook County jails). These infection rates are consistent with those in prisons. See
Volpenhein, supra note 21 (reporting infection rates as high as 80% at the Marion Correctional Institute
in Ohio).
132
See, e.g., Eddie Burkhalter, Less Than 1 Percent of Alabama Inmates Have Been Tested for
COVID-19, ALA. POL. REP. (May 29, 2020), https://www.alreporter.com/2020/05/29/less-than-1percent-of-alabama-inmates-have-been-tested-for-cov [https://perma.cc/ES49-3GNF]; Elise Schmelzer,
22 Inmates at Denver’s Two Jails Under Observation After Showing Coronavirus Symptoms, None Have
Been Tested, DENVER POST (Mar. 20, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/20/denverjail-coronavirus-observation/ [https://perma.cc/RBH4-HHPZ].
133
See, e.g., COVID-19 Infection Tracking in NYC Jails, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://legalaidnyc.org/covid-19-infection-tracking-in-nyc-jails/ [https://perma.cc/3ET4-PCWV].
134
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
135
See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Dan Morse & Spencer S. Hsu, As Inmates in D.C., Maryland and
Virginia Test Positive for the Coronavirus, Jail Officials Scramble to Reduce the Risk, WASH. POST (Apr.
1, 2020, 7:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/as-inmates-in-dc-marylandand-virginia-test-positive-for-the-coronavirus-jail-officials-scramble-to-reduce-therisk/2020/04/01/b0d9cfd8-7363-11ea-85cb-8670579b863d_story.html [https://perma.cc/EFU2-JPTU].
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education, or even a stable home, the lack of jobs, exclusion from school
upon arrest, inequities in education opportunities, widespread housing and
food insecurity, lack of mental health facilities, and lack of addiction
treatment facilities in marginal communities become a pathway to the
criminal justice system, a basis to detain, and an impediment to release. This
is clear in a time of crisis, but it is equally clear that one cannot have a
conversation about meaningful pretrial detention reform (or criminal justice
reform), without addressing the reality that we use our jails and prisons to
house the very people that we fail to support in other contexts.
C. Considering Safety and Communities in Crisis
When weighing the interest of the defendant in pretrial release against
the state’s interests in safety, pretrial actors consider the defendant’s interests
as distinct from the community’s interests protected by the state. Yet, the
recognition of a detainee’s interest in safety squarely raises questions about
how “community safety” is calculated, both in terms of which communities
count for this calculation and, more fundamentally, why a defendant’s
interests are separated from the community’s in pretrial decision-making.
These are linked inquiries and they are inquiries made simultaneously more
visible and more complex in the context of COVID-19.
The current health crisis confirms, in ways previously obscured or
ignored, that a defendant’s community is shifting and multifaceted. A
defendant may call a particular community his home, but during periods of
detention the community he shares contact with includes jail staff. Fully
contemplating community safety in this time of crisis, therefore, requires
consideration of the risk pretrial detention may pose to those people a
detainee comes into contact with as a product of his detention. Put another
way, a COVID-19 outbreak in a jail affects not only those detained, but jail
staff and their families.136 The calculation of community safety during this
public health crisis must therefore shift to consider more effects on
communities than simply a defendant’s predicted risk of future
dangerousness.
Beyond this, the current crisis highlights the false dichotomy promoted
by the pretrial detention system between the defendant’s liberty interests and
136
Infection among jail staff makes this plain. See, e.g., Bernadette Hogan, NY State Prison Guards
Beg Cuomo to Protect Workers from Coronavirus, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2020, 4:53 PM),
https://nypost.com/2020/03/30/ny-state-prison-guards-beg-cuomo-to-protect-workers-from-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/8L2Y-A7DE] (noting that fifty-six New York correctional officers tested positive for
the virus); Deanna Paul & Ben Chapman, Rikers Island Jail Guards Are Dying in One of the Worst
Coronavirus Outbreaks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rikersisland-jail-guards-are-dying-in-one-of-the-worst-coronavirus-outbreaks-11587547801
[https://perma.cc/EY6B-673H].
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the community’s safety interests. Prosecutors and courts tend to focus on the
community interest in the defendant’s detention, rather than the threat a
defendant may face if detained or the community interest in keeping the
defendant out of custody.137 Yet, the Court’s decisions with regard to
punishment suggest at least a shared constitutional concern over the
detainee’s safety while in custody and the community’s interest.138 Even if
one does not believe the community has an interest in a detainee’s safety
during ordinary times, it certainly does now, given the threat of COVID-19.
For inmates, the threat of infection while detained during this time of crisis
is high.139 For the community, there is an imperative to reduce the rate of
infection among all populations.140 In order to accomplish this goal of
reduced infection rates, the community has an interest in maintaining the
health and safety of vulnerable populations—including those made
vulnerable by lack of medical care or ability to comply with safety
precautions as a result of pretrial confinement. In this way, the interest in the
safety of the inmate and the community align.
This alignment is even more apparent when we consider that detainees
are released daily regardless of what pretrial decisionmakers do. The
majority of jailed detainees don’t have life sentences.141 They serve a term of
imprisonment (often as pretrial detainees) and are released (assuming they
survive). Others are acquitted or have their charges dropped.142 Some are
detained for short periods before their bail hearings and then released. While
a full discussion of the reality of this cycle of reentry is beyond the scope of
this Essay, the fact that it exists further underscores the need for sensible
pretrial decision-making during this time of crisis. As jail populations move
in and out of facilities and back to their communities, they carry with them
contagions from their places of incarceration. The failure to enact sensible
policies that preserve inmate safety create avoidable community risk
regardless of the point of release.

137

See Gouldin, supra note 32, at 891–92.
See supra notes 117–18.
139
This claim is true for all defendants, but particularly those who fall into high-risk categories: the
elderly, immunocompromised, and pregnant.
140
See Roberts, supra note 8 (explaining that reducing the number of COVID-19 cases overall is
essential so that hospitals and other necessary responders are not overwhelmed).
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(2018),
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Richard M. Aborn & Ashley D. Cannon, Prisons: In Jail, but not Sentenced, AM. Q. (Jan. 16,
2013),
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Moreover, when considering public safety concerns pretrial decisionmakers tend to speak in terms of the public as one body and the defendant as
another—as if a defendant lives in complete isolation without a community
or family of his own.143 The “community” requires protection from the
defendant—his past criminal record, or his lack of resources or a home,
counseling toward some lurking future danger from which the court must
insulate the community.144 This calculation, however, makes assumptions
about the community that often fail to take into account the community’s
own perceptions of the risk the defendant poses or the hardship that the loss
of the defendant may produce in the lives of those around him.145 In fact, the
community interest in safety is often not separate from the defendant’s, but
entwined with it. This is not to say that in every case the community is better
off when a defendant is released, or that every member of the community
may benefit or suffer in the same ways when a defendant is detained, but it
is to say that separating a defendant’s and a community’s interest may fail to
properly appreciate the complex dynamics of “community safety.”
The COVID-19 crisis heightens the potential harm of detention and
highlights the importance of calculating community safety in terms that take
the defendant into account—not only as a matter of the defendant’s safety
but as a matter of the community’s. The current public health crisis raises the
hard question of whether detaining a defendant for any period creates so
significant a communal risk that community safety counsels toward release
in all but extreme cases. This risk presents itself in multiple scenarios: A
detained defendant may never come home, and their community may suffer
the long-term effects of their permanent absence. Or, if left to linger in a
highly susceptible jail facility, the detainee may bring the contagion back to
the community, creating a new infection source. Or, an outbreak in a jail
might send sick and dying detainees to already overtaxed hospitals, creating
further resource scarcity in an already overburdened system.146 In any of
these scenarios, pretrial release becomes a means of preserving not just the
defendant’s health and safety but the community’s. Likewise, fiscal concerns
may counsel toward release as a means to reduce overcrowding not only in
jails, but in medical facilities.
143

See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 251–52, 255 (2019) (describing this phenomenon in the context of prosecution).
144
See Gouldin, supra note 32, at 850; Mayson, supra note 33 at 2221, 2281; Mayson supra note 68,
at 495 n.18, 523–24, 568.
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See Carroll, supra note 54, at 11.
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See, e.g., Connor Sheets, Alabama Prison System’s COVID-19 Plan Anticipates Widespread
Infection,
Deaths,
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Guard
Intervention,
AL.COM
(Apr.
5,
2020),
https://www.al.com/news/2020/04/alabama-prison-systems-covid-19-plan-anticipates-widespreadinfection-deaths-national-guard-intervention.html [https://perma.cc/EG7Q-2GEX].
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For pretrial decision-makers, these public safety concerns coupled with
the financial implications of closed courts, prisons declining transfers from
local jails, infection risk for inmates and jail staff, and rising costs of medical
care all counsel towards a reconsideration of the risks a defendant’s release
poses.
Despite these claims, one response might be for courts to decline to
release any defendant once detained as a way to stop the virus from spreading
to the community. Indeed, this argument has been floated by state
prosecutors and police as an appropriate response to COVID-19, and by DOJ
as a necessary component of the current state of emergency.147 On April 1,
2020, BOP locked inmates in their cells for two weeks in hopes of halting or
slowing the spread of COVID-19 in an already compromised system.148
Some local actors have followed suit, declining to release pretrial detainees
citing public safety concerns.149
Such a plan follows a particular logic: if you fear that the virus will
spread rapidly in jails and may be undetectable in some of those infected,150
detaining all persons indefinitely will effectively insulate the remaining
population from any risk of infection. This logic, however, ignores the
Court’s own doctrine on pretrial release—a doctrine that presumes freedom
as a default and detention as a last resort.151 It runs contrary to fundamental
constitutional principles that the accused do not forfeit all rights in the face
of arrest, detention, or even a pandemic and the fear it generates.

147
See Betsy Woodruff Swan, DOJ Seeks New Emergency Powers Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,
POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/21/doj-coronavirusemergency-powers-140023 [https://perma.cc/RYA2-WSAX]. Congress has pushed back on this request
but will likely grant some additional powers. Riley Beggin, DOJ Asks Congress for Broad New Powers
amid COVID-19. Schumer Says, “Hell No.,” VOX (Mar. 22, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/3/22/21189937/coronavirus-department-justice-dojpowers [https://perma.cc/KTB4-4Y4T].
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See, e.g., Alice Speri & Akela Lacy, Louisiana’s Coronavirus Plan for Prisons Could Create
Death Camps, INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/04/07/louisianacoronavirus-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/S7EK-BPGE].
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See Jing Cai et al., Indirect Virus Transmission in Cluster of COVID-19 Cases, Wenzhou, China,
2020, 26 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1343, 1343,
1345 (2020); Melissa Healy, How ‘Silent Spreaders’ Are Fueling the Coronavirus Pandemic, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-03-17/how-silent-spreaders-arefueling-the-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2A6M-LH2H] (both noting asymptomatic carriers
pose a high risk for transmission given that COVID-19 carries a long phase of “silent” viral shedding
before symptoms actually develop).
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See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Taken to its extreme, it is a logic that would dictate that a defendant
should continue to be held even after completing a sentence. If that feels
unsustainable as a matter of policy or humanity or constitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment (and, spoiler alert, it should), then it should feel equally,
if not more, unsustainable in the context of pretrial detention in which a
defendant has not even been convicted. It is a logic that transforms any
possible period of detention into a death sentence, both for the detainee and
for those who work in our jails, and that ignores the reality that even those
already exposed to the virus are less likely to infect others if they self-isolate
rather than remain incarcerated in crowded and unsanitary conditions.
It is also a logic that will tax already strained medical facilities. As
Governor Andrew Cuomo laments the lack of hospital beds and ventilators
in the state,152 and inmates at Rikers Island are offered $6 an hour to dig
graves,153 the impact of mass infection in jails and prisons is starkly apparent.
As of July 23, 2020, the Marshall Project reported 70,717 cases and 681
deaths in prisons.154 In a closed environment with no opportunity for effective
social distancing, infection and mortality rates will continue to rise. For
medical facilities this translates to the introduction of even more patients into
a system that is already overburdened.155
A system that defaults to detention to house, feed, and treat the
marginal—whether through indefinite and lawless detention in this time of
crisis or finite detention beyond—is destined to create a carceral cycle that,
in the end, fails us all. A continued system that imagines an all-or-nothing
proposition in which the most vulnerable among us must either be detained
pretrial or be released without support, and in which the interest of our
community is diametrically opposed to that of the accused, is likewise
unsustainable and cruel. Instead, in the face of this crisis and beyond we
should recognize what is surely and fundamentally true: a defendant is part
of the very community pretrial decisionmakers seek to preserve and protect.
The borders of that community may shift and change, but what does not
152
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change is the reality that a defendant’s detention will create a void in that
community that may well value his presence and his life.
CONCLUSION
This Essay began as a warning. In the face of a burgeoning health crisis,
it sought to chart a path forward in which pretrial detainees might be released
rather than remain in custody while the infection spreads throughout the
nation’s jails. In the weeks of its writing, this Essay has borne witness—like
so many others—to the awful collision between the criminal justice system
and COVID-19. In New York, one of the epicenters of the crisis, officials
moved to release many inmates, including pretrial detainees.156 And yet,
among those remaining, COVID-19 infection rates are nine times the rate of
the free population.157 As confirmed cases and deaths mount, the prediction
of the susceptibility of incarcerated populations has proven horrifically
accurate.
Of course, the current COVID-19 crisis did not break the pretrial
detention system. The system has long suffered all the cracks and
deterioration of a system built on inequity and injustice. The crisis, however,
highlights the failings of the system in new ways. The overcrowding in jails
that makes the spread of COVID-19 so likely highlights how many are held
in jails not because they present a true risk but because they are poor, targeted
by discriminatory laws and policing practices, unable to make bail, pay for a
condition of release, or simply have nowhere else to go.158
Pretrial detention is not the only aspect of the criminal justice system
affected by COVID-19. As the crisis has heightened, procedural safeguards
within the system have collapsed. Court closures have delayed trials,
suspended jury rights, and delayed appellate processes.159 Closed jails have
excluded not only in-person visitation of family members but also access to
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in-person meetings with counsel.160 Sentenced defendants are facing risks not
contemplated at the time of sentencing, raising Eighth Amendment concerns.
Finally, court decisions to sentence even in the face of the epidemic subject
defendants to unnecessary and unwarranted risks in the name of business as
usual during a time that is anything but usual.
Like pretrial detention, COVID-19 did not break these systems.
Failures in the criminal justice system are heightened by the crisis, but they
will persist long after a vaccine is found and COVID-19 becomes a historical
event. However, in highlighting these problems on a national scale, this crisis
presents an opportunity for reform. Most fundamentally, it offers an
opportunity to recognize that those detained within the system are not
isolated or forgotten populations but are linked to our larger community. It
is an opportunity to recognize that as our nation moves forward, we must
think of safety and liberty interests not just in terms of those best able to
weather this crisis through the inconvenience of self-isolation and limited
supplies, but in terms of how the most marginal among us will weather this
storm. It is an opportunity to question the system and its daily inhumanity.
And, in the end, it is a chance to bring about meaningful change.
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